Nimrod crash report names and shames 10 people...what do MP's do?

Nothing. Not a thing. No hauling these people into the palace of Westminster for a grilling by MP's, no demand that the Ministry of Defence sack these people, no attempts of Parliament to remove these people from office.

The Independent reports the ten people directly responsible for this crash, and the only action that has so far been taken is to shift two RAF servicemen to a different position. Much like shifting paedophile priests from parish to parish.

If someone is so incompetent that they have caused the deaths of 14 service persons, they should not only be immediately removed from ANY position, but they should find themselves serving a prison sentence.

Here are the ten people named in the report from the Independent.

General Sir Sam Cowan
Appointed the first Chief of Defence Logistics in April 1999. Gen Cowan set a target the following year of reducing costs by 20 per cent by 2005. He left the post in August 2002 and is now retired.

Air Chief Marshal Sir Malcolm Pledger
He succeeded Gen Cowan as Chief of Defence Logistics in September 2002 despite later admitting to Mr Haddon-Cave's review he did not believe he was fully qualified for the job.

Group Captain (now Air Commodore) George Baber
He was the leader of the Ministry of Defence integrated project team responsible for a safety review of the RAF's Nimrod that took place between 2001 and 2005. Mr Haddon-Cave accused Group Capt Baber of a "fundamental failure of leadership".

Wing Commander Michael Eagles
As head of air vehicle for the Nimrod, he was supposed to be in charge of managing production of the safety review. But the report found that he delegated the project "wholesale" to a civilian worker.

Frank Walsh
He was safety manager for the Nimrod review and primary point of contact with the BAE Systems team carrying out the work.

Chris Lowe
As chief airworthiness engineer for BAE Systems, he was heavily involved in preparing the main documents in the Nimrod safety review. The report said he bore the heaviest responsibility for the "poor planning, poor management and poor execution" of the project.

Richard Oldfield
He was the leader of the Nimrod review for BAE Systems. The report found he did not come clean about large gaps in the analysis of possible risks and failed to manage the project properly.

Eric Prince
As the company's flight systems and avionics manager, he played a key role in the Nimrod safety project.

Martyn Mahy
He was Nimrod review task manager for defence technology firm QinetiQ. Mr Haddon-Cave criticised him for failing to do his job properly in certain key areas.

Colin Blagrove
As technical assurance manager for the Nimrod safety review, it was his ultimate responsibility to ensure QinetiQ did not sign off anything unless it was appropriate to do so. The report concluded that he failed in this "critical task".